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ABSTRACT: this article aims at presenting central concepts in the sign sciences reading 
Bakhtin’s philosophy of language with Peirce’s semiotics. Insofar as the sign models 
proposed are dialectic and dialogic, they account for the live processes of semiosis in 
contrast to glottocentric and anthropocentric orientations. From different perspectives 
both philosophers evidence the open and dynamic nature of signs and sign activity, their 
processual nature as material in becoming in open-ended fluxes of infinite semiosis, the 
connection between signs and values, the centrality of dialogic otherness in 
interpretive/translative processes, the implications for verbal and nonverbal semiosis, 
specifically for our conceptions of language, communication, body, and self. This essay 
develops around the following topics: sign, text, utterance; the dialogic nature of the sign 
“self”; reading together Bakhtin and Peirce; dialogue and argumentation; dialogism and the 
voice; dialogism and otherness in the “great experience”; dialogism and critique of identity; 
the grotesque body and its signs. 
KEYWORDS: Dialogue; Intercorporeity; Otherness; Utterance; Voice 
 
RESUMO: este artigo tem como objetivo apresentar conceitos centrais nas ciências dos 
signos lendo a filosofia da linguagem de Bakhtin juntamente com a semiótica de Peirce. Na 
medida em que os modelos de signos propostos são dialéticos e dialógicos, eles representam 
os processos vivos de semiose, em contraste com as orientações glotocêntrica e 
antropocêntrica. A partir de diferentes perspectivas, os dois filósofos evidenciam a 
natureza aberta e dinâmica dos signos e da atividade sígnica, sua natureza processual como 
material em constante transformação e em indeterminados fluxos de semiose infinita, a 
conexão entre signos e valores, a centralidade da alteridade dialógica em processos 
interpretativos/translativos, as implicações para a semiose verbal e não verbal, 
especificamente para as nossas concepções de linguagem, comunicação, corpo e “eu”. Este 
ensaio se desenvolve em torno dos seguintes temas: signo, texto, enunciado, a natureza 
dialógica do signo "eu"; leitura conjunta de Bakhtin e Peirce; diálogo e argumentação; 
dialogismo e a voz; dialogismo e alteridade na "grande experiência"; dialogismo e crítica da 
identidade; o corpo grotesco e seus signos. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Diálogo; Intercorporeidade; Alteridade; Enunciado; Voz 
 
/rdxl_ìü: /thlc$-äm qgqvç@Êäm /thzEà  qgqztgçl_@à 
epz@Ém /eagçJìä qgqrfzvJ-ùbqgqqsqzv_ù, epzZ>Ìm 
tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém thlqggqzcvJ-òâm ysgçEÌàm /tgqzçA<>b/rfçT 
ysgçEÌàm whzA>Ìm /yqz*ì keuq¬qvqqqqgeawsgqqqqgepyq wgsqeuqqqgqjqepeu, 
yqlEûä. qsqcJ< - qsqcJ> /eogleogz&1ìü1,2é tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém 
/thlç@_-Ém /egazJân /egaz_ìm ygqtgqeawsgeaepeuq¢qvwsgqqqqgepyq, 
/qgqlv%ìm eoqxlJä>brfçFÁm tqqqgzl#Ê tglvJù. thzç@à 
/qjqlvÃí /qggqlzJÂmÜ qggqlcJëm ysgçEÌm qgqztgçl_@à /eagzJä 
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/thlvJË /thl@_-Ì /egazJön tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém yqv@òû 
tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém kzÇêû. /thzEà /tglcJìàm keuq¬qveakeu 
qgqlJËä /eoglç&1âü qggqqgql_3<2> tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém qggqqgql_2<2> 
rgfgv@ /thcçT$õ. tqqqgzl# /thzEà /thzJÊ? roqçQä 
yqtgqwsgeuqjqqqqqgegayqegaeu /egazJön /thzçJön, tdzEêm /thlcJ-
êÊbthlcJê<. keuq¬qvqqqqgkeu kqggqzzç*$-Ém /whlv%ìm, kqggqzzç*$-
Ém qgqlJé. /tdxlJà, qgqçJù /qggqlzJÂ qgqzEÉm 
/tgqzçAbrfçT /epzJân tdçK<>ä /whlv%ìm euq¢q>bqgqçxK<. 
eoqxlJä tdz#Êm /thxlJÊàm qgqtgllvJ-ù, /qgqçv_2 
tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém, qggqqgqzçv_3<2> /qggqysgçJ-ò, qgggqqgqzçv_4<2> 
/euçAÌà, wgqgqzçv_5<2> /egazJân tglvJüù eptglzc&1$-ãû 
qgqlJ>bqgqçxK<. thlqggqzcvJ-òâm /egogçl&1-àü qgqvç@Êäm whzA>Ìm 
/whlv%ìm wgsqeuqqqqgqjqepeu. /egazJân eagzçAâ /thçl_@-É 
/egazJân, rsqçHã /egazJân /eogz&1ìü1,2 roqçQä. rfzDö 
/roqzJí /egazJön qooqçAâm eaaagzK<Êm 
roqxlQä>b/qsqroqxlJ wgsqçJÊà tgzrfgçz$3_1,2ém. /egazJân.  
 
1 For a critique of “decodification semiotics” 
 
As Valentin N. Voloshinov had already demonstrated in Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language (1929, Eng. trans. 1973), the instruments provided by 
so-called “decodification semiotics”, or “equal exchange semiotics” are 
inadequate for a convincing analysis of the essential characteristics of human 
communication. My reference here is to such characteristics as dialogism, 
otherness, plurivocality, ambiguity, polysemy, plurilingualism –  internally to a 
single so-called “national language” as much as externally in the relation among 
different languages. 
In the framework of so-called “equal exchange semiotics” or 
“decodification semiotics” the sign is divided into two parts: the signifier and 
the signified (respectively, the sign vehicle and its content). These are related 
on the basis of the principle of equal exchange and of equivalence – that is, of 
perfect correspondence between communicative intention, on the one hand 
(which involves codification of a message), and interpretation (understood as 
decodification of communicative intention), on the other.  
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In Italy, the Italian philosopher and semiotician Ferruccio Rossi-Landi 
had already systematically critiqued this approach in his monograph of 1961, 
Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune (Meaning, communication and 
common speech). And his criticism came at a time, that is, the 1950s and 
1960s, when decodification semiotics and the equal exchange sign model were 
very much in fashion and on the rise on the scene of sign and language studies 
worldwide. We know that Bakhtin and his Circle had already formulated and 
given voice to their own critique in publications of the 1920s, but we also know 
that their work was not to come to the attention of the wide public before the 
1970s when the English translation of Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosphy 
of Language appeared, followed by its translation into Italian, in 1977, 
promoted by Augusto Ponzio whose monograph on Bakhtin soon followed, the 
first internationally, in 1980. 
Rossi-Landi ironically tagged the equal exchange sign model associated 
with decodification semiotics as the “postal package theory”. He pointed out 
that to describe communication in terms of the exchange of messages was 
reductive, for such an approach could not account for the complexity of the 
processes of communication, expression and interpretation in real life. Analysis 
of communication in terms of messages (the postal package) complete in 
themselves that pass from a sender to a receiver (from one post office to 
another) was an oversimplification: according to this model, all the receiver 
must do is decipher the content of the message which is preestablished with 
respect to the exchange relation, that is, simply decode it.  
Important to underline is that this sign model was inspired by Ferdinand 
de Saussure’s theory of the sign (1916) and as such is based on value theory as 
conceived by marginalistic economics from the School of Lausanne (L. Walras 
and V. Pareto). However, as Rossi-Landi pointed out in a series of important 
studies subsequent to 1961 including his 1968 monograph, Il linguaggio come 
lavoro e come mercato (Eng. trans. Language as Work and Trade, 1983), 
followed by Linguistics and Economics in 1975, assimilation of the study of 
language to the study of the marketplace in an ideal state of equilibrium as per 
marginalist economics gives rise to a conception of the sign that is static and 
consequently incapable of accounting for live communication. In other words, 
according to this approach the sign is viewed in a synchronic framework and is 
 105 
dominated by the equal exhange paradigm, that is to say, by the paradigm of 
perfect correspondence between communicative intention and restitution of 
that intention, between that which is given and that which is received. This 
paradigm is based on equal exchange logic as it regulates social relations today 
in the dominant social reproduction system, that is, the capitalist, now the post-
capitalist.  
Decodification semiotics is developed with reference to the Saussurean 
sign model and is rooted in a series of dichotomic pairs: langue and parole, 
signifiant and signifié, diachrony and synchrony, and the syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic axes of language. In the sphere of communication studies these 
notions were associated to the mathematical theory of communication as 
elaborated by Shannon and Warren Weaver (1949), which soon favored 
translation into such binary pairs as code and message, transmitter and 
receiver. These concepts were thought to provide an adequate description of all 
types of sign processes – not just simple sign processes of the signal type 
relative to information transmission, but also complex sign processes at high 
degrees of semioticity as characterizes real life human communication globally 
and in its different aspects (for the distinction between sign and signal, see 
Voloshinov 1929; and infra). This explains why the semiotics of Saussurean 
derivation has been described with such expressions as “decodification 
semiotics” (Rossi-Landi 1968), semiotics of “code and message exchange” 
(Bonfantini 1981), or “equal exchange semiotics” (Ponzio 1973). 
But human communication with special reference to verbal language 
cannot be contained within the two poles of langue and parole as described by 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), nor is it contained by any of the oppositional 
pairs described above: signifié and signifiant, code and message, transmitter 
and receiver, etc. And, as pointed out above, Mikhail Bakhtin with various 
members from the Bakhtin Circle, notoriously such figures as Valentin N. 
Volosinov and Pavel N. Medvedev, had already demonstrated all this very 
clearly in their early writings of the 1920s.  
 
2 Signs, signals and meaning 
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Now, before proceeding some considerations are in order on the 
distinction between “signs” and “signals”; therefore between “semioticity”, 
“signness” or “signhood”, on the one hand, and “signality”, on the other. The 
signal is a sui generis sign. Signals occur in the sign network, but unlike other 
signs the interpretants of a signal occur on a single “interpretive route”. The 
“interpretive route” converges with meaning as developed in the deferral from 
one sign to the next as described by Augusto Ponzio in his 1990 monograph 
Man as a Sign. This means to say that signals are univocal, monological. As 
such the signal is characterized by a low degree of dialogism and otherness by 
comparison to the sign. Or, rather, the signal is a sign at a low degree of 
semioticity. Signals are mostly conventional in the sense that the relation 
between the interpreted sign (that is, the sign object of interpretation) and the 
interpretant sign (that is, the sign that interprets the former sign and confers 
meaning upon it) is to a large extent determined arbitrarily, with reference to a 
law. Therefore signals presuppose a code, that is to say a system of rules. 
Consequently, the interpretant of the signal is preestablished on the basis of the 
code in question.  
However, signals do not only form a special class of signs. Signality is a 
dimension of semiosis that is also present in signs at high levels of semioticity. 
In fact, from this point of view it is appropriate to speak of “signality” rather 
than of “signals” given that the latter suggests a separate category among signs. 
The expression “signality” indicates that dimension of signness which is 
characterized by low degrees of otherness and dialogism. Even verbal signs 
which are characterized by their potential for multivoicedness and polylogism, 
contain a margin of signality. However, verbal signs are not determined in their 
specificity by signality, just as they are not determined in their specificity by 
physical materiality. All the same, signality is constitutive to verbal signs. 
Signality comes into play when interpretation is limited to mere identification 
or decodification. For example, as when a speaker is called to recognize a given 
sound, a phonia by contrast to another (pig/big), a syntactical structure and 
semantic content, and so forth. 
In the case of signality, the interpretant is an “interpretant of 
identification” at low degrees of dialogism and otherness. Instead, in the case of 
signness or semioticity, the interpretant is an “interpretant of anwering 
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comprehension” or “interpretant of responsive understanding” characterized 
by ever higher degrees of dialogism and otherness (see Petrilli 2010: 49–56).  
By contrast to the signal, the interpretive potential of the sign at higher 
degrees of otherness is not exhausted in a single interpretive route, in a single 
meaning. In other words, the the interpreted sign, or signifier, and the  
interpretant sign, or signified, do not relate to each other on a one-to-one basis. 
We have anticipated that meaning is not simply an intentional message 
formulated by an emitter and sent off to the receiver according to a precise 
communicative will. Consequently, the work of the interpretant sign cannot be 
limited to the basic operations of identification, mechanical substitution, or 
mere recognition of the interpreted sign. By contrast to signals, signs at high 
levels of semioticity are not interpreted simply on the basis of fixed and pre-
established codes, through decodification processes and on the basis of identity 
logic. As Volosinov obersves in Marxism and the Philosophy of Language: 
 
In the speaker’s native language, in other words, for the 
linguistic consciousness of a member of a particular language 
community, signal recognition is certainly dialectically effaced. 
In the process of mastering a foreign language, signality and 
recognition still make themselves felt, so to speak, and still 
remain to be surmounted, the language not yet fully having 
become language. The ideal of mastering a language is absorption 
of signality by pure semioticity and of recognition by pure 
understanding. (Voloshinov 1929; Eng. trans.: 69) 
 
In real life communication processes the sign is a dialogic unity of self-
identity and otherness, signality and signness. What Voloshinov describes as 
the “actual sense” of a sign, it’s “theme” is oriented by otherness logic and 
consists of something more with respect to the elements that permit its 
recognition or identification. Actual sense is formed of those semantic-
ideological aspects of a sign that in a certain sense are unique to it, that specify 
it in its singularity. Actual sense is inextricably interconnected with the 
situational context of the semiosis in course.  
Voloshinov evidences the dialogic relation between these two aspects of 
the sign, indicating them as “meaning” – all that which is reproducible and 
stable in the sign and is subject to a process of identification; and “theme” – the 
more innovative and creative signifying aspects of the sign which require active 
comprehension, a response, a standpoint, and are connected to the specific 
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situation in which semiosis occurs. With reference to the verbal sign and 
considering the dialectic relation between “theme” and “meaning”, Voloshinov 
observes the following:  
 
[...] it is even impossible to convey the meaning of a particular 
word (say, in the course of teaching another person a foreign 
language) without having made it an element of theme, i.e. 
without having constructed an example – utterance. On the other 
hand, a theme must base itself on some kind of fixity of meaning; 
otherwise it loses its connection with what came before and what 
comes after – i.e. it altogether loses its significance. (Ibid.: 100) 
 
In Significato, comunicazione e parlare comune, Rossi-Landi grafts the 
tradition in sign and language studies that leads from the two twentieth 
century masters of the sign in the USA, Charles S. Peirce and Charles Morris, 
combined with elements from Oxonian analytical philosophy, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, and Hugo Dingler’s operationism onto 
the trunk of Continental, non idealistic historicism. In this monograph Rossi-
Landi introduces the concept of “common speech”; subsequently, in his 1968 
monograph, he translates “common speech” into the concept of “linguistic 
work” (see his essays collected posthumously in the volume Between Signs and 
Non-signs, 1992). Rossi-Landi also proposes another very important 
distinction, that between “initial meaning” which is explicit meaning and 
“additional meaning” which is implicit meaning.  
The distinction between so-called “initial meaning” and “additional 
meaning” is part of a general conception that views meaning as part of the real 
life processes of communication and interpretation, as part of the historico-
social, intersubjective and dialogic dimensions of signifying processes. “Initial 
meaning” involves experience, practice, value, familiarity with a given 
environment, and possible speakers that range from the restricted family group 
to the extended community. “Additional meaning” is determined in the 
intersubjective and dialogic character of signifying practices and presupposes 
orientation towards the other.  
The distinction between “initial meaning” and “additional meaning” cuts 
across the distinction between meaning fixed by use and meaning dependent on 
context. Implicit meaning, indirect, latent, hidden, absent, remote, secondary, 
unconscious meaning is present in meaning dependent on context as much as 
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in meaning that is autonomous with respect to a given communicative 
situation. Implicit meaning is also present in meaning that is fixed by tradition. 
In any case, both  “initial meaning” (explicit meaning) and “additional 
meaning” (implicit meaning) are active in Saussure’s langue and parole, in 
Bachtin-Voloshinov’s “meaning” and “theme”, as much as in Peirce’s 
“interpretant” which he classifies as “immediate interpretant”, “dynamical 
interpretant” and “final interpretant” (see Peirce in Hardwick 1977: 108-112 ). 
Understanding is possible thanks to the understood, that is, thanks to 
implicit meaning, the “enthymeme” in the terminology of Bakhtin and 
Voloshinov. Vagueness itself is structural to the very possibility of 
understanding. The English philosopher and linguist Victoria Lady Welby even 
maintains that the more we attempt to be precise, the less we are capable of 
understanding each other (Petrilli 2009). To make implicit meaning or 
indeterminate meaning explicit, to render the invisible visible means to 
inaugurate new interpretive routes, new signifying paths and, therefore, to 
introduce new enthymemes, new implications, new additional meanings, new 
variables, new accentuations, intonations, ever greater degrees in signifying 
otherness in situations of dialogized extralocalization. In such a framework, 
verbal communication involves dialogic investigation and approximation by 
interlocutors, that is, interpretants, in relation to the referent of discourse – 
whether a general referent, ultimate truth, or the restricted, immediate 
referent. Saying, explicitation, specification, therefore, in the last analysis, 
signifying and understanding all presuppose the understood, the unspoken, 
implied meaning, indeterminacy and vagueness. And as the authors so far 
mentioned in this essay teach us, all these aspects both presuppose and 
augment semioticity thereby enhancing signifying potential and contributing to 
the generation of new possible worlds. 
 
3 Sign, text, and utterance 
 
The sign model proposed by Bakhtin and his Circle can be characterized 
as dialectic and dialogic. The sign is neither described as an isolated entity 
which has been defined once and for all, nor as a “piece” in a sign system, 
endowed with specific value developed on the basis of relations of “mechanical 
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opposition” with other pieces forming that system. Nor does the sign converge 
with the message alone. This would involve another oversimplification, for the 
message too is just another component in the act of communication. In reality, 
the sign is an open system of relations in becoming where the terms forming 
these relations are forever changing roles.  As such the sign is open and 
dynamic and is more appropriately designated in terms of process. In addition 
to such aspects as the sender, receiver, and message, other elements forming 
sign or semiosic processes include the interpretant, referent, situational 
context, implied meaning, value, and so forth. The sign converges with a sign 
situation, a sign event taken globally where the parts interact dialectically and 
dialogically in open-ended and unfinalized semiosic processes. 
With specific reference to verbal signs, Bakhtin thematizes the utterance 
which is contextualized in relation to a given language, discourse genre, social 
context and ideological orientation. The utterance may be viewed as a rejoinder 
in a dialogue, as a text shared by interlocutors, as part of an interpersonal 
relation in a given historical-social context. The text thematized by Bakhtin is a 
live text and not a reified text, where the latter alludes to the text understood 
as a monological expression separated from the live context of communication, 
analyzed in terms of the relation among linguistic units that constitute it with 
reference to language understood as a langue, that is, as a linguistic code. On 
the contrary, on Bakhtin’s description the text takes shape and flourishes in 
the relation with other texts, or utterances, and other con-texts where the 
relation among elements is dialogic and call for interpretation that is 
responsive, critical and creative, that is for what Bakhtin calls the 
“interpretant of answering comprehension” or “interpretant of responsive 
understanding” which is analogous to Charles S. Peirce’s notion of  the 
“dynamic interpretant”. 
Sign interpretation in fact cannot be limited to identification. 
Interpretation requires “active comprehension”, that is, “responsive 
understanding”. The sense of a sign, its significance consists in something more, 
an excess with respect to the elements that allow its recognition: sense is 
formed of those semantic ideological aspects which are indissolubly connected 
to the situational context of semiosis, and which under certain aspects are 
unique. Comprehension of the sign is “active comprehension” because it calls 
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for a response, a standpoint. It arises from a dialogic relation and in turn 
engenders a dialogic relation: the sign flourishes as a rejoinder in a dialogue (cf. 
Bakhtin 1970–71).  
Referred to the verbal, the sign is a complete utterance, it is not isolated 
from the social context, the field of the ideological or from the discourse genre 
to which it in fact belongs (“the unending variety of discourse genres”, says 
Bakhtin in ‘From Notes Made in 1970-71’: his unfinished texts published 
posthumously include the title ‘The Problem of Speech Genres’, Eng. trans 
Bakhtin 1986). The utterance is understood as a constitutive part of a socially 
and historically specified relation, as a living text and not as an inanimate 
entity; not as an isolated monologic expression to be interpreted on the basis of 
the relation between linguistic units and abstract language. 
Dialogic relations structural to the sign cannot be reduced to binary 
relations of mechanical opposition internal to the text. Binary relations may 
account for identification processes as described above, but certainly not for 
interpretive processes at the level of “sense” and “significance”. Important to 
underline, as does Bakhtin in “Toward a Methodology of the Human Sciences” 
(1974), is that the relation among signs, text, utterances and their parts 
presuppose relations among unique single individuals, that is, among unique 
bodies and voices: 
 
The text lives only by coming into contact with another text 
(with context). Only at the point of this contact  between texts 
does a light flash, illuminating both the posterior and anterior, 
joining a given text to a dialogue. We emphasize that this contact 
is a dialogic contact between texts (utterances) and not a 
mechanical contact of “oppositions”, which is possible only within 
a single text (and not between a text and a context) among 
abstract elements (signs within a text), and is necessary only in 
the first stage of understanding (understanding formal 
definition, but not contextual meaning). Behind this contact is a 
contact of personalities and not of things (at the extreme). If we 
translate dialogue into one continuous text, that is, erase the 
divisions between voices (changes of speaking subjects), which is 
possible at the extreme (Hegel’s monological dialectic), then the 
deep-seated (infinite) contextual meaning disappears (we hit the 
bottom, reach a standstill). (Bakhtin 1986: 162) 
 
Bakhtin’s notion of the text is far broader than the notion of the sign 
considered as an isolated unit; like the live sign, like the sign that flourishes in 
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the relation with other signs, the text too can only flourish and signify in the 
light of a still broader context: the intertextual context of dialectic/dialogic 
relationships among texts. The sense of a text develops interrelatedly with 
other texts, along the boundaries and margins of another text. As Bakhtin had 
already annotated in “The Problem of the Text”: “The dialogic relationships 
among texts and within the text. The special (not linguistic) nature. Dialogue 
and dialectics” (Bakhtin 1959-61, in 1986: 105). 
This approach gives full play to the centrifugal forces of linguistic-
cultural life, thematizing otherness, polysemy, and dialogism as constitutive 
factors of the sign’s very identity. The categories developed by decodification 
semiotics are most often oversimplifying, especially in their application to 
discourse analysis, writing, and ideology.  
On the other hand, so-called “interpretation semiotics” with its theory of 
sense, significance, and interpretability (“interpretanza”, in Umberto Eco’s 
terminology, cf. 1984: 43), with its broad, flexible and critical conception of the 
sign accounts for signification as much as for communication, thereby 
providing a far more exhaustive description of human communicative 
interaction.  
The sign model developed by interpretation semiotics is a dynamic model 
that does not at all refer to the notion of equivalence between one sign and 
another, between the signifiant and the signifié, to the logic of equal exchange 
and equivalence between the language system, on one side, and the utterance, 
on the other (langue/parole). Instead, interpretation semiotics thematizes 
deferral from one sign to the next in the open chain of semiosic fluxes, the 
situation of renvoi from the interpreted sign to the interpretant sign. These two 
sign factors (the interpreted sign and the interpretant sign) which can only 
effectively emerge in semiosic processes are connected according to the logic of 
non-correspondence and excess, the logic of otherness.  
According to such logic the interpretant sign never corresponds exactly 
to the previous sign, the interpreted sign, but says something more (Peirce, CP 
2.228), developing and enriching the preceding sign with new meanings. The 
interpreter/interpretant responds to something, and in so doing becomes a sign 
which in turn gives rise to another interpretive response, in turn the object of 
interpretation by another interpretive response, and so forth. In such a 
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perspective, the function of the interpretant sign is not limited to the mere 
identification of the previous sign, but rather is taken to various levels of 
“responsive understanding”, which implies the existence of a concrete dialogic 
relationship among signs regulated by the principle of reciprocal otherness. As 
Bakhtin says, once again in “The Problem of the Text”: “Being heard as such is 
already a dialogic relation. The word wants to be heard, understood, responded 
to, and again to respond to the response, and so forth ad infinitum” (1986: 
127). Semiosis ensues from this live relation and certainly not from any 
abstract relationship among the signs forming a sign system.  
 
4 The dialogic nature of the sign “self” 
 
Sign models are also intimately related to our conceptions of the self 
given that the self converges with sign material, verbal and nonverbal. In fact, 
both Bakhtin and Peirce thematize the human being in terms of sign relations. 
As Voloshinov clearly maintains in Frejdizm (1927), the conscious and the 
unconscious are made of dialogically structured verbal and nonverbal sign 
material. 
Like Bakhtin and his Circle Peirce also evidences the role of dialogism 
and otherness in the life of signs, with which he too contributes toward a more 
profound understanding of dialogic structures and practices. His thought-sign 
theory evidences the dialogic structure of the self insofar as it consists of sign 
material and develops in terms of dialogue between a thought acting as a sign 
and another sign acting as an interpretant. 
The Peircean sign model is today gaining wide consensus in both 
semiotics and the philosophy of language and is now gradually supplanting the 
Saussurean sign model. This is of no small account given that the Saussurean 
sign model is associated with structuralism which has spread from linguistics 
(and semiology) to the human sciences generally, influencing and modelling 
them even.  
Decodification or equal exchange semiotics thematizes a subject 
grounded in the logic of identity, therefore at a low margin of otherness or 
dialogism. According to this approach, the subject coincides perfectly with its 
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own consciousness, it fully manages its own sign processes, subjecting what it 
communicates to its own will as a sender and coder. 
On the contrary, those trends in semiotics which refer to the Peircean 
model of sign and generally come together under the banner of “semiotics of 
interpretation” thematize the production of sense and meaning in terms of 
open-ended semiosic processes in becoming without the guarantees offered by a 
code regulating exchange relations between interpreted signs and interpretant 
signs (Peirce, CP 5.284). 
The description of signifying processes in terms of unending semiosis, of 
interpretive processes characterized by dialogic responsiveness, in terms of 
deferral or renvoi from an interpreted sign to an interpretant sign has 
consequences for the theory of identity and of the subject. In fact, contrary to 
their description in the perspective of decodification semiotics, in the 
framework of interpretation semiotics identity and subjectivity are no longer 
described in terms of coherent and unitary entities. Instead, otherness is placed 
at the very heart of identity, is described as constitutive of identity which 
develops in the dialectic and dialogic dynamic between the sign and its 
interpretant in thought processes forming a single conscious as much as in the 
relationship among different selves. Identity, the self, the conscious develop in 
open-ended semiosic processes, that is to say in the relation between the 
thought-sign and the interpretant, according to the dynamics of responsive 
understanding, dialogism, and otherness.  
For both Peirce and Bakhtin, the self is constructed dialogically in 
translative/interpretive processes which connect thought-signs to 
interpretants in chains of deferrals that are potentially infinite: in such a 
framework the self is always other which means to say that it is never wholly 
present to itself and only in such a context can the self effectively subsist as 
self. Therefore, the self-other relationship subsists not only in the more obvious 
case of the relationship between different selves, but also between the multiple 
“selves” forming a single, “individual” consciousness. The self does not contain 
interpretive processes within itself, it does not preexist with respect to 
interpretive processes, nor does the self have perfect control of such processes. 
Far more significantly the self converges with the chain of sign-interpretant 
relations in which it recognizes itself, to the point that experience of the self of 
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another person is not a more complicated problem than that relative to 
recognizing certain sign-interpretant relations as “mine”, those through which 
“I” become aware of myself. Consequently, as Peirce says, just as we say that a 
body is in motion and not that motion is in the body, thoughts are not trapped 
inside us but develop in the relation with other thought-signs in the dialogic 
dynamics between inside and outside. In Peirce’s own words from a note to 
“Some Consequences of Four Incapacities”: “[…] just as we say that a body is in 
motion, and not that motion is in a body we ought to say that we are in thought 
and not that thoughts are in us” (CP 5.289, n. 1) (Petrilli 2013). 
  
5 Reading together Bakhtin and Peirce 
 
It is possible to construct a powerful semiotic model by associating the 
Bakhtinian notion of sign with the Peircean. This model can explain the 
complexity of signs or semiosis far better than any other model tending to 
reduce the sign to two perfectly correlated parts, the signifiant and the signifié 
Reference here is to semiology of Saussurean matrix (Saussure of the Cours 
rather than of the anagrams) which not only conceives the sign in terms of 
equal exchange between signifant and signifié, but also only theorizes two poles 
in linguistic life between which all linguistic and (taking linguistics as the 
model) all semiological phenomena take place: these two poles are the unitary 
system (langue) and individual use of this system by the single speaker 
(parole).  Reading together Peirce and Bakhtin (see Ponzio 1990, 2006a). 
helps demonstrate how the sign model proposed by decodification or equal 
exchange semiotics is oversimplifying and naive, given that in such a 
framework the sign: 1) is put at the service of meaning that is already given 
and pre-established outside the communication and interpretation process 
itself; 2) is thematized as a passive instrument in the hands of a subject that in 
turn is given, pre-established, and in full control over the sign processes it 
produces; and 3) can be decodified on the basis of a pre-existent code common 
to both partners in the communicative process. 
Instead, the sign model proposed by interpretation semiotics refers 
particularly to categories introduced by Peirce such as his analysis of 
interpretants into “immediate interpretant”, “dynamic interpretant”, and “final 
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interpretant”; his subdivision of the object into “immediate object” and 
“dynamic object”; his most renowned sign triad – “symbol”, “index”, and “icon”, 
etc. Peirce places the sign in the dynamic context of semiosis and works on the 
concept of “unlimited semiosis” which presupposes the relationship between 
the sign and its interpretant viewed as a dialectic and dialogic relationship (see 
Peirce’s Collected Papers, vol. 2).  
Both Peirce and Bakhtin place the sign in the context of dialogism in 
which alone can it flourish as a sign. In fact, though these scholars work 
independently of each other and in different directions (Peirce focused 
primarily on questions of a cognitive order, Bakhtin on literary language, they 
both recognize dialogism as an essential characteristic of the sign. As 
anticipated above, in addition to “dialogism” central notions in Bakhtin’s 
studies on the sign include “otherness”, “answering comprehension”, “text”, 
“intertextuality”, and so forth. 
What ensues from reading Bakhtin and Peirce together is a sign model 
that is dialectic or “dialogic” (understood as dialectic founded on dialogue) 
where signs and semiosic processes converge. Once the dialogic nature of the 
sign is recognized, it no longer appears as an autonomous unit endowed with 
meaning preestablished outside the communicative event, with a value of its 
own determined in the relationship of mechanical opposition with the other 
units forming the sign system. In Ponzio’s words: “Once signs are no longer 
reduced to a single element, or broken down into their component parts, it is 
difficult to say where they begin and where they end. Signs are not things, but 
processes, the interlacing of relations which are social relations (1990: 260). 
In the situation of impasse characterizing decodification semiotics, like 
Bakhtin Peirce’s approach represents a means of escape and development. His 
Collected Papers include studies on signs that go back to the second half of the 
nineteenth century, but these volumes (8 in all) only began appearing in 1931. 
Today major anthologies collecting his works include Writings of Charles 
Sanders Peirce. A Chronological Edition and The Essential Peirce.  
In his studies on the sign Peirce recovers the forgotten connection with 
sign studies from the Middle Ages, a major reference point being Peter of Spain 
and his Tractatus. Summule logicales. In his renown essay of 1867, “On a new 
list of categories”, Peirce describes the concepts he believed most suitably 
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account for the polyhedric nature of the sign. An even more articulate version 
of this description is available in his letter of 12th October 1904 to Victoria Lady 
Welby, which focuses on the relationship between signs and knowledge: 
 
a sign is something by knowing which we know something more. 
With the exception of knowledge, in the present instant, of the 
contents of consciousness in that instant (the existence of which 
knowledge is open to doubt) all our thought & knowledge is by 
signs. A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its 
object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other in 
such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the 
object corresponding to its own relation to the object. I might say 
“similar to its own” for a correspondence consists in a similarity; 
but perhaps correspondence is narrower. (Peirce in Hardwick 
1977: 31–32) 
 
A sign or representamen stands to someone for something in some 
respect or capacity. The sign stands to someone in the sense that it creates “an 
equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign”, in the interpreter; that is, it 
creates an interpretant sign (CP 2.228). Moreover, the sign stands for 
something in some respect or capacity in the sense that it does not refer to the 
object in its entirety (dynamic object), but only to some part of it (immediate 
object). Therefore, a sign subsists for Peirce according to the category of 
Thirdness; it presupposes a triadic relation between itself, its object, and the 
interpretant thought, itself a sign. A sign always plays the role of third party 
precisely because it mediates between the interpretant sign and its object. 
The meaning of a sign is an (open) class that includes that sign and all its 
possible interpretants. The mediating function between the meaning and object 
of a sign is in turn achieved through the mediation of other signs. According to  
Peirce, a sign exists according to the category of ‘thirdness’, in other words, it 
presupposes a triadic relation among itself, its object and the interpreting 
thought, it too a sign. A sign always plays the role of third party given that it 
mediates between the interpretant sign and its object.  
A sign grows as a consequence of its excursions to the outside with 
respect to itself, and of its relations with other signs. Nor are the relations we 
are alluding to relations of equal exchange. On the contrary, equal exchange 
characterizes the signal where, by contrast to the sign, a one-to-one 
correspondence is established between signifier and signified (on this aspect 
Voloshinov’s analyses are enlightening). 
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Peirce’s semiotics focuses on the concept of interpretation and associates 
meaning (which Saussurean semiology leaves unexplained) to the interpretant 
– that is to say, to another sign which takes the place of the preceding sign. 
Insofar as it is a sign, the interpretant subsists by virtue of another 
interpretant in an open-ended chain of renvois rooted in the potential creativity 
of interpretive processes. According to this perspective, semiosis is not 
guaranteed a priori thanks to the possibility of appealing to a code that is fixed 
previously with respect to semiosis, for the code itself does not subsist outside 
interpretive processes. Indeed the code as well is established and supported by 
semiosic processes.  
The concept of “mediation” is closely interrelated with that of 
“interpretation” and “infinite semiosis” and is another fundamental concept in 
Peirce’s theory. The sign is mediated by the interpretant without which it 
cannot express its meaning and in turn mediates the relationship with the 
object in any interpretive act whatsoever, from the simplest levels of perception 
to the most complex levels of knowledge.  
Meaning does not reside in the sign, but in the relationship among signs. 
More precisely, the meaning of a signal is the class which contains that signal 
and its interpretants according to relations of mere substitution (a red traffic 
light has a single meaning and is a signal, in other words, its meaning is the 
class of meanings that substitute the color red: ‘Stop’ in the graphic or phonic 
form, a policeman with outstretched arms, etc.). 
The sign no doubt also contains a factor of signality and its correlate, self-
identity, but this does not characterize it insofar as it is a sign. Comprehension 
of a sign is not merely a question of recognizing fixed and repeatable elements. 
Human signs are characterized by their semantic and ideological flexibility, 
which makes them available to ever new and different signifying contexts. 
Where there are signs, the factors of signality and self-identity are transcended 
by the traits that are specific to signs: changeability, ambivalence and multi-
voicedness.  
In the framework of Peirce’s cognitive semiotics logic and semiotics are 
related on the basis of the assumption that knowledge is mediated by signs, 
indeed is impossible without them. Interpretation semiotics substitutes the 
dichotomy between “signifier” and “signified” with the triadic relationship 
 119 
between “object”, “sign”, and “interpretant” which is characterized in terms of 
symbolicity, indexicality, or iconicity depending on the type of interaction 
among the parts. In any case, whichever aspect prevails the role of the 
interpretant remains fundamental. Meanings evolve dynamically in open-
ended interpretive processes. The greater the degree of otherness in the 
relationship between the interpretant sign and the interpreted sign, therefore 
of dialogism, the more interpretation evolves in terms of active dialogic 
response, creative reformulation, inventiveness, rather than as mere 
repetition, literal translation, synonymic substitution, identification. 
 
6 Symbol, index, and icon 
 
A sign subsists and develops in the dialectic among symbolicity, 
indexicality, and iconicity. This accounts for the different degrees of dialogism 
in the relationship between signs and interpretants, and between the premises 
and the conclusion of an argument. A sign is never a pure symbol, but also 
contains traces of indexicality and iconicity; similarly, as much as a sign is 
prevalently indexical or iconic, it will always maintain a certain margin of 
symbolicity. In other words, like symbols in the case of indices and icons as well 
mediation by an interpretant and recourse to a convention are necessary. It 
follows that all signs share in the character of symbolicity, indexicality, and 
iconicity and to varying degrees: for example, verbal signs, though 
fundamentally conventional, also contain a certain degree of indexicality and 
iconicity. 
Symbolicity is an expression of the conventional character of the sign – 
that is, of the relation of constriction by convention between a sign and its 
object as established on the basis of a code, of a law. The symbol is not 
immediately related to its object if not through the interpretant, without which 
it could not subsist as a symbol. However, even if the symbol is founded on a 
code, a convention, a law, the latter in turn is also founded in turn on an open 
process of unending deferral and renvois from one sign to the next: 
consequently, even in the case of symbols, the sign’s relationship with the 
object is never completely univocal. Symbolicity is present in all signs to 
varying degrees and not just in the symbol (in which of course it is a 
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characterizing element). In the above-mentioned letter to Welby date 12th 
October 1904, Peirce gives the following definition: “I define a Symbol as a sign 
which is determined by its dynamic object only in the sense that it will be so 
interpreted. It thus depends either upon a convention a habit, or a natural 
disposition of its interpretant, or of the field of its interpretant (that of which 
the interpretant is a determination) (in Harwick 1977: 33). 
According to Peirce, in signs of the conventional type where the 
relationship with the object is established by an external law and necessarily 
depends on the interpretant, the category of Thirdness dominates. Thirdness is 
ultimately concerned with the sign in its relation to the interpretant. 
Indexicality refers to the compulsory nature of signs, to the relationship 
of cause and effect, of necessary contiguity, of spatio-temporal contiguity 
between a sign and its object. As Peirce puts it: “I define an Index as a sign 
determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it” 
(Ibid.). Unlike symbols in the case of indices it is not the interpretant that 
decides the object. Rather, the relationship between the sign and the object 
preexists with respect to interpretation as an objective relationship, and in fact 
conditions interpretation. The sign and what it is a sign of are given together, 
independent of the interpretant. However this does not exclude the inevitability 
of resorting to a convention for the relationship between a sign and its object to 
become a sign relationship.  
The indexical character of signs prevails in traces, symptoms, and clues, 
in the relationship between fire and smoke, between the spots on the skin and a 
liver disease, between a knock at the door and the fact that someone is behind 
the door and wants to enter. Given that the relation here between the sign and 
the object is of cause and effect, of necessary contiguity (natural contiguity, 
inferential contiguity, etc.), and as such subsists independently of the 
interpretant, indexical signs are characterized by the category of Secondness. 
The icon is characterized by a relation of similarity between the sign and 
its object, and similarity (or resemblance or likeness) takes on different forms 
as in the case of images, metaphors, and graphs: “I define an Icon,” as Peirce 
explains in his correspondence with Welby, “as a sign which is determined by 
its dynamic object by virtue of its own internal nature” (Ibid.). The dominating 
factor in iconic signs is not at all a system of conventions, natural causality, or 
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any other form of contiguity. The iconic sign signifies without depending on a 
code, a convention, on conferral of sense by a preestablished interpretant. The 
iconic sign is self-signifying, has meaning in itself, imposes itself on its own 
account: its virtue of signifying is an expression of its sign quality.  
The iconic sign reaches a maximum degree of independence with respect 
to its object, and the interpretant can occur in a system of sign relations that is 
distant from the icon, and in extreme cases is even invented ex novo – neither 
through a relation of necessary contiguity (index), nor of conventionality 
(symbol), but of hypothetical similarity. Though containing traces of 
symbolicity and indexicality, the iconic relation is distinguished by the 
character of affinity, attraction, innovation, creativity, dialogism, and 
otherness. Given its relative signifying independence with respect to the object 
and the interpretant, the icon expresses the reality of Firstness. 
Iconicity and dialogism are intimately connected; indeed, the highest 
degrees of dialogism are reached in iconic signs (Bonfantini and Ponzio 1986; 
Ponzio 1993). Not being the expression of a convention, the mechanical effect 
of a cause, etc., iconicity is connected with the concepts of responsive 
understanding, active participation, dialogic evaluation, point of view, semiotic 
materiality, resistance in terms of signifying processes and interpretation; 
iconicity cannot be contained within the boundaries of identity logic, but, quite 
on the contrary, is oriented by the logic of otherness, of opening to the other 
(Petrilli 2010). On considering icons and dialogism together, a useful expedient 
is to imagine them as rejoinders in a dialogue – that is, in terms of a creative 
response to the verbal or nonverbal standpoint of another interlocutor, 
whether a provocation, prayer, threat, question, etc. 
Necessity characterizes signs of both conventional and indexical type 
with the difference that in the first case the relation of necessity ensues from 
accepting a convention, while in the second it is passively endured as the result 
of an external effect. Consequently, in both symbols and indices dialogism is 
relatively reduced. However, we also know that signs generally depend on their 
relationship with interpretants, but while such dependency is a determining 
factor in the symbol owing to the dominance of conventionality, it carries less 
weight in indices and icons. Peirce classifies the index and the icon as 
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degenerate signs (a term taken from the language of mathematics) by contrast 
to symbols which he describes as relatively genuine signs. 
 
7 Dialogue and argumentation 
 
A fundamental characteristic of interpretation semiotics by contrast to 
decodification semiotics is the light it sheds upon inferential processes. 
Inferences are developed in the passage from a sign to its interpretant which as 
we have said are related dialogically. Inferences (or as Peirce also calls them, 
arguments) may be divided into three types: deduction, induction, and 
abduction, that is inferential processes characterized by the predominance of 
indexicality, symbolicity, or iconicity. In deduction the relationship between the 
sign and the interpretant is dominated by indexicality, in induction by 
symbolicity, in abduction by iconicity. 
To consider sign processes in terms of an unending chain of deferrals 
from one interpretant sign to the next leads sooner or later to the need to 
consider the terms and sense of this opening; or, rather, as Eco says, it leads to 
the need to examine the question of “the limits of interpretation”, as recites the 
title of one of his monographs (1990). Eco singles out two conceptions of 
interpretation: on the one hand to interpret means to highlight the objective 
nature of a text, its essence independent of interpretation; on the other, the 
text is described as being subject to infinite interpretation. Eco criticizes the 
latter conception which he classifies in terms of “hermetic semiosis”, 
maintaining that the Peircean theory of unlimited semiosis is something 
altogether different, contrary to appearances and to the opinion of certain 
scholars. The main object of Eco’s criticism is Jacques Derrida’s notion of 
“infinite deferral” as elaborated in the framework of “deconstructionism” 
(Derrida 1967). Eco argues that the deconstructionist notion of “infinite drift” 
differs from Peirce’s concept of “infinite semiosis”, and does so on the basis of 
Peirce’s notion of habit. The latter is connected to the intersubjective character 
of interpretation. It is always fixed by community convention. As Eco says, 
from the moment when the community agrees with a given interpretation, 
there is, if not an objective, at least an intersubjective meaning which acquires 
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a privilege over any other possible interpretation spelled out without the 
agreement of the community (Eco 1990: 40). 
Eco’s specifications concerning the Peircean notion of “infinite semiosis” 
points to the dialogic character of interpretation. The relationship between 
interpretants is dialogic.  
Dialogism helps evidence still other aspects of the relationship between 
signs in different signifying practices. For example, on the basis of the relation 
he establishes between the sign theories of Bakhtin and Peirce and in his 
commitment to theoretical and terminological systematization, Ponzio authors 
an essay entitled “Signs to talk about signs” (1985) in which he describes 
meaning and signifying processes in verbal and nonverbal signs in terms of 
interpretive routes. Motivated by the ambitious aim of developing adequate 
verbal instruments to talk about signs, he recalls Morris’s own project as 
proposed in Foundations of the Theory of Signs (1938): to understand meaning 
as an “interpretive route” means to place it in the context of dialogic 
relationships which whilst responding to both the Peircean and Bakhtinian 
notion of the sign, represents an original aspect of Ponzio’s research.  
Meaning is described as a possible interpretive route in a dense sign 
network, a route interweaving with other routes, with other meanings 
branching out from the same sign. On taking off from the sign intersection, one 
may choose and shift among a multiplicity of alternative itineraries. Meaning 
emerges as a signifying itinerary in a sign network, as an interpretive route 
simultaneously well defined and yet subject to continual amplification and 
variation by virtue of continual dialogic contacts with other and alternate 
interpretive routes.  
This explains the indeterminacy, openness, and semantic availability of 
the sign which finds its place in the context of dialogic relationships. These 
emerge: (1) in the relationship between the sign and its interpretant, which in 
argumentation is (2) the relationship between the premises and the conclusion, 
characterized by a minor or major degree of dialogism in deduction, induction, 
and abduction (Peirce); (3) in the relationship among the multiple 
interpretants, verbal and nonverbal, forming the open trajectory of the 
interpretive route; and (4) in the relationship among the interpretants of 
different interpretive routes. 
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Such a description contributes towards a better understanding of the 
distinguishing features that characterize human communication (Petrilli 
1990a, 1990b). As mentioned at the beginning of this essay such features 
include ambiguity, polysemy, plurivocality, heteroglossia, dialogism, the 
“semiotic materiality” of signs, – that is, the otherness, resistance, and semiotic 
autonomy of signs and their meanings with respect to other signs as well as 
with respect to the self that produces, uses, and interprets them. 
 
8 Dialogism and the voice 
 
Bakhtin focuses on the relationship between dialogue and the body as 
early as the 1929 edition of his book on Dostoevsky. Dialogism cannot be 
obtained among disembodied minds. Dialogue takes place among voices — not 
monologic and integral voices, but internally dialogic and divided voices. And 
the voice is described as representing an ideological position embodied in the 
word. Bakhtin highlights the problematic of the embodiment of the voice.  
However, his statement that Dostoevsky’s hero is voice and that the 
author does not show it to us as though it were an object, but has us listen to it 
is misunderstood by René Wellek (1991) as the expression of idealism. Such a 
misunderstanding is perfectly in line with critique carried out against Bakhtin 
by the representatives of “socialist realism” and their unjust accusation of 
“polyphonic idealism”. Such critique reproposes the opposition established by 
Merezkovsky between Dostoevsky “prophet of the spirit” and Tolstoy “prophet 
of the flesh” (see A. Ponzio’s introduction in Bakhtin 2008).   
In Dostoevsky dialogue is determined in the hero’s claim above all to 
complete independence from recognition from the other, that is, in the hers’s 
claim to autonomy from the other’s gaze, from the other’s word. Here dialogue 
arises from ostentation of absolute indifference to the opinion of others, to their 
value judgements. This is particularly obvious in the monologue of the man 
from the underworld. His obsession with autonomy leads the hero to anticipate 
the possibility of denial by the other, through the word of the other. But, as 
Bakhtin claims the hero’s anticipation of the other’s reply and his response to 
this reply actually reveals his dependence on the other (himself included). The 
hero fears that the other may think that he fears his opinion. But such fear 
reveals his dependence upon the consciousness of the other, his inability of 
being satisfied with his own self-determination.  
Dostoevsky is not interested in showing the human being engaged in a 
dialogue that is fully respectful of the other. On the contrary, dialogue is 
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achieved in spite of oneself, of one’s own intentions. Dostoevsky the novelist 
reveals how the word is dialogic in the sense that it is passively involved in the 
word of the other, always and inspite of itself. Dialogue does not only occur in 
the composition of viewpoints and identities; on the contrary, it is structured in 
refractoriness to synthesis, including the illusory synthesis of one’s own 
identity. In fact, identity is fragmented dialogically insofar as it is inevitably 
implicated with alterity, just as the “grotesque body” is implicated with the 
body of others (Bakhtin 1965). 
 As Bakhtin claims, dialogue in Dostoevsky is neither dialectical nor 
synthetic due to the fact that contradiction does not arise from disembodied 
ideas: the ultimate givenness for Dostoevsky is not the idea conceived in terms 
of a monologic conclusion, but the event of interacting voices. Ideas are 
embodied in different voices that are unindifferent to each other, in spite of or 
even because of the delusory effort to ignore each other, in spite of or even 
because of the delusory attempt at evading the polyphony of the many voices in 
which each voice flourishes in relation to the other, each in its singularity. 
Ideas are incarnate ideas and precisely because of this the logic of Dostoevsky’s 
polyphonic novel presents itself in dialogic terms. 
 Dialogism constitutes the real life of the word and of thought processes. 
And with respect to such a condition, monologic dialogue is an abstract 
representation relieved of all responsibility without alibis. On the contrary, 
unlimited responsibility is the condition of being in the world, where the body of 
each single individual occupies a position that cannot be exchanged with 
another. Embodiment is expressed through the voice. And when in “From Notes 
made in 1970-71” Bakhtin in fact describes the process that leads from 
concrete dia-logics without synthesis to abstract monologic dialectics, he 
indicates the voice as a fundamental element in the distinction between dia-
logics and dialectics:  
 
Take a dialogue and remove the voices (the partitioning of 
voices), remove the intonations (emotional and 
individualizing ones), carve out abstract concepts and 
judgments from living words and responses, cram 
everything into one abstract consciousness — and that’s 
how you get dialectics. (Bakhtin 1986: 147) 
 
In Bakhtin’s view, the voice, its incarnation, the body all distinguish 
Dostoevsky’s dialogue from Plato’s in which (as much as dialogue is not 
completely monologized, pedagogical), the multiplicity of voices are cancelled in 
the idea. Plato is interested in the disincarnated ideal, the idea as being and not 
 126 
as a dialogic event, the event itself of dialogue. In Plato, participation in the idea 
is not participation in dialogue, but in the being of the idea. Because of this, 
different and unindifferent voices are annulled in the unity of belonging to a 
common entity. Moreover, in Bakhtin’s view, another element that 
distinguishes between the two different types of dialogue is given by the fact 
that in Dostoevsky, by contrast to Plato, dialogue is neither cognitive nor 
philosophical. Bakhtin prefers to relate dialogue in Dostoevsky to biblical and 
evangelical dialogue, for example, dialogue in Job, because of its internally 
infinite structure that has no possibility of synthesis and is external to the 
sphere of knowledge. However, Bakhtin also warns us that not even biblical 
dialogue furnishes the more substantial characteristics of dialogue in 
Dostoevsky’s writings.  
Bakhtin made a point of emphasizing the body’s direct involvement in the 
circumspect word objectivated by Dostoevsky. He evidences the implications, 
the effects registered in the hero’s relationship with his body ensuing from a 
word that is aware and cautious of the other, in spite of itself, a word that 
reveals its unindifference to the other precisely when flaunting maximum 
indifferente towards the other, rejection of the other, antagonism towards the 
other. As the example of the man from the underworld makes very clear, the 
body is overwhelmed by an interference of voices which denies it self-
sufficiency and univocality; the body does not belong to the hero, it is not its 
own, for it is exposed to the gaze and to the word of the other.  
The body puts the individual’s presumed autonomy into crisis, rendering 
the idea of autonomy and self-sufficiency illusory and even ridiculous. Instead, 
the body is constitutively intercorporeal in both a diachronic and synchronic 
perspective. Despite separation, identification, membership, distinction, 
homologation functional to individuality, the body of each one of us remembers 
its constitutive intercorporeity in spite of memory as determined in the “small 
experience”, and does so in terms of the “great experience”.  
 
9 Dialogism and otherness in the “great experience” 
 
Bakhtin distinguishes between “small experience” and “great experience” 
in his annotations of the 1950s: “small experience” is experience that is 
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reduced and partial, that is functional to the concrete and effective world, that 
is appropriate to contemporaneity, that is reduced to interest, utility, and 
knowledge functional to practical action, to the economy of memory which 
excludes all that which distracts and is dispersive with respect to logicality, 
unilinearity, uniformity in terms of social planning, univocality in terms of 
sense.  Whereas in the “great experience”, the world does not coincide with 
itself (it is not what it is), it is not closed and finalized. In the great experience 
memory flows and fades away into the human depths of matter and of 
boundless life, the experience of worlds and atoms. And, as Bakhtin emphasizes 
throughout his writings, for such memory the history of the single individual 
begins long before its cognitive acts (its cognizable “Self”) (see, for example, 
“The Problem of Speech Genres” and “The Problem of the Text”, in Bakhtin 
1986). 
The carnivalesque participates in “great experience” understood as 
offering a global view of the complex and intricate life of bodies and signs. This 
conception emphasizes vital bodily contact and reveals how the life of each and 
every one of us is implicated in the life of every other, underlining the bond that 
unites all living beings to each other. This is a “religious” (from Latin religo) 
view of the existent. It highlights bodily excess with respect to specific 
functions as well as sign excess with respect to a specific meaning: signs and 
bodies – bodies as signs of life – are ends in themselves. On the contrary, the 
minor and more recent ideological tradition is vitiated by reductive binarism: 
this sets the individual against the social, the biological against the cultural, the 
spirit against the body, physical-chemical forces against life forces, the comic 
against the serious, death against life, high against low, the official against the 
non-official, public against private, work against art, work against non official 
festivity. Through Rabelais Bakhtin recovers the major tradition and criticizes 
the minor and recent conception of individual body and life, which is inherent 
in capitalism as well as in real socialism and its metamorphoses. Dostoevsky’s 
polyphonic novel is in line with this major tradition in Weltanschauung, as 
Bakhtin demonstrates in the 1963 secondo edition of his original (1929) 
monograph on Dostoevsky. 
The body is refractory to the “technologies of self” and to the “political 
technology of the individual” (Foucault). The body is other with respect to the 
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subject, with respect to consciousness, to domesticated, graded, filtered, 
adapted memory; it is other with respect to the narration that the individual or 
collective subject constructs for itself and through which it delineates its 
identity. The body is other with respect to the image presented by the subject as 
its identity card, with respect to the image one wishes to exhibit and wants to 
interest others in, one’s physiognomy offered for recognition, the role recited. 
This body that is other is viewed in terms of singularity, unrepeatability, 
nonfunctionality. It finds the expression of its excess in relation to a given 
project, story, “authentic” choice in death, considered as an unconclusive end: 
the living body that knows before being known, that feels before being felt, that 
lives before being lived, that experiences before being experienced. This body is 
connected to other bodies without interruption in continuity, it is implicated, 
involved with life over the entire planet Earth, it is part of the general 
ecosystem, an interrelated complex from which no technology of self can ever 
free us. 
The signs of bodily and dialogic interconnection have not been studied 
sufficiently, and what studies have been carried out are limited to the sectorial 
interests of specific scientific fields. That the self is inevitably an incarnate self,  
intercorporeal being, that is to say, a body connected to other bodies from the 
very outset, an expression of the condition of intercorporeity on both a 
synchronic and diachronic level, that the self is not incarnated in a body 
isolatedly from other bodies is not indifferent to our conception of the single 
individual.  The self is an incarnate entity from the point of view of biological 
evolution, of the species, as well as from the point of view of sociality and of 
cultural history. The body plays a fundamental role in the development of 
awareness or consciousness. Consciousness is incarnate consciousness. The 
body is a condition for the full development of consciousness, of the human 
being as a semiotic animal (Deely, Petrilli, Ponzio 2005). The self develops 
interrelatedly with other bodies through which it extends its boundaries which 
are the boundaries of the world it experiences. The word is an extension of the 
body. Indeed, echoing Voloshinov (1929), the word is a bridge joining my own 
body to the body of others over territory that is shared by interlocutors – 
speaker and listener, utterer and interpreter. 
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10 Dialogism and the critique of identity 
 
Dialogism plays a central role in argumentative reasoning, that is, in 
reasoning that has not stiffened into the defense and reproduction of identity, 
but, on the contrary, is open and available to otherness. As Bakhtin evidences 
in “From Notes Made in 1970–71”, discursive unilaterality, the ossification of 
logical procedure, rectilinear and unilateral dialectics all derive from 
sclerotized dialogue. Monologic, unilinear and totalizing dialectics is 
necessarily oriented toward a synthesis and a conclusion and as such calls for a 
“Critique of Dialogic Reason” (Ponzio 1993; Ponzio and Petrilli 2005).  
The whole course of his research, including his final essa of 1974, 
“Toward a Methodology for the Human Sciences”, concentrates on the same 
problem faced by Jean Paul Sartre in his Critique de la raison dialectique, that 
is, whether knowledge and understanding in man by man not only implies 
specific methods but also a new form of reason. However, this problem cannot 
be adequately understood simply by postulating a new relationship between 
thought and its object as Sartre believed (1960). In fact, Sartre’s dialectics 
remains wholly inside the limits of monologic dialectics given that he reduces 
the relation of otherness to a relation of identity and of reciprocal 
objectification: dialectics between for self and for others is dialectics in 
totalizing consciousnesses, where the tendency is to assert one’s own 
objectifying view over the other. 
The critique of dialogic reason is the critique of the logic of Identity, 
dominant in Western thought and praxis today. In the perspective of identità, 
sense coincides with partial and limited interests and engenders mystification, 
whether reference is to the identity of smaller groups such as the single 
individual, nation, language, cultural system, or to larger groups, to macro-
communities such as the European Union, the United Nations, the Western 
world, etc. 
The category of Identity dominates today’s world because of the concrete 
abstractions which are constructed upon it and form the reality we experience: 
these concrete abstractions are “internal” to today’s dominant social 
reproduction system. They include individual, society, state, nation, truth, 
knowledge, equality, justice, freedom, limited responsibility, need, equal 
exchange, etc. However, it is not only a question of the concrete abstractions 
produced by the system. Even more importantly, the system itself is grounded 
in the category of identity. The logic of identity is asserted structurally and 
constitutively, as universal in the worldwide and global processes of 
production, equal exchange and consumption. The dominant logic that orients 
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concrete abstractions in today’s processes of social reproduction is the logic of 
identity. And such notions as the individual with its rights, obligations, and 
responsibilities; society and its interests; the state and its politics functional to 
the world as it is, to reality; equal exchange and its demands – all such notions 
obey the logic of identity.  
The places of argumentation internal to the order of discourse are the 
places of the logic of identity. Reason includes the reason of war even if in the 
form of extrema ratio, which presents war as legitimate, just and legal. Reason 
includes the reason of the elimination of the other — from emargination and 
segregation to extermination. Reason is the reason of identity. Its logic is 
asserted by barricading, isolating, expelling or exterminating the other thus 
laying the conditions for the construction of the concrete abstractions 
mentioned above. As anticipated, these concrete abstractions include the 
category of the individual which, in the first place, must sacrifice its own 
otherness to itself in order to assert itself as identity. 
The critique of reason and argumentation thus understood requires a 
point of view that is other. This approach calls for preliminary recognition of 
the other, or, better, recognition of the fact that recognition of the other is an 
inevitable imposition (see Ponzio 1996). Recognition of the other not as a 
concession, a free choice made by the Individual, the subject, the same, but as a 
necessity imposed by alienation, the loss of sense, by the situation of homo 
homini lupus. The situation of homo homini lupus consequent and not 
mythically antecedent to (the allusion is to Hobbes’s fallacy!) such concrete 
abstractions as state, politics, law.  
Globalization related to capitalist production and the expansion of bio-
power (Foucault) have led to the controlled insertion of bodies into the 
production system and to reinforcement of the idea of the individual as a 
separate and self-sufficient entity. The body is understood and experienced as 
an isolated biological entity, as belonging to the individual, as part of the 
individual's sphere of belonging. This has led to the progressive and almost total 
disappearance of cultural practices and worldviews grounded in 
intercorporeity, interdependency, exposition to the other, opening to the other. 
The technologies of separation applied to human bodies, to interests, to the life 
of individual and collective subjects are functional to global communication-
production and to the identification of production with consumption 
characteristic of today’s reproductive system. 
With respect to all this and thanks to its ontological perspective, “global 
semiotics” (Seboek 2001; Petrilli and Ponzio 2003), if nothing else can oppose a 
whole series of signs showing how each instant of individual life is wholly 
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interrelated, even compromised with all other forms of life over the entire 
planet. In fact, to acknowledge the condition of intercorporeal and dialogic 
interrelatedness means to recognize a form of responsibility that far exceeds all 
positive rights and all limited responsibilities, restricted responsibilities with 
alibis. Such acknowledgement is ever more urgent the more the reasons of 
production and of global communication functional to it impose ecological 
conditions which impede and distort communication among bodies and between 
the body and the environment of which it is part. 
 
11 The grotesque body and its signs 
  
The different forms of perceiving the body by popular culture, discussed 
by Bakhtin in Dostoevsky (1963) and Rabelais (1965), the forms of “grotesque 
realism”, are almost extinct. In fact, the body and corporeal life as perceived by 
popular culture do not respond to today’s conception of body or corporeal 
physiology, for the body is neither wholly individualized nor wholly detached 
from other life forms over the planet, from the rest of the world. Rather than 
view the body as an isolated biological entity, as a sphere belonging to the 
individual, grotesque realism presents the body as undefined, unconfined to 
itself, in a relation of symbiosis with other bodies, of transformation and 
renewal through which the limits of individual life are continually transcended. 
On the contrary, in today’s world of global communication-production verbal 
and nonverbal signs connected to the practices and conceptions of the 
grotesque body have almost completely disappeared as the individualistic, 
private, static conception of the body is asserted. What remains are mummified 
residues studied by folklore analysts, archeological residues preserved in 
ethnological museums and in the histories of national literatures (the 
expression of a situation of generalized museumification. Signs of the grotesque 
body of which only very weak traces have survived in the present day include 
ritual masks, masks used during popular festivities, carnival masks.  
The signs and language of the grotesque body privilege and exalt those 
parts of the body, excrescences and orifices, that most favour communication 
with other bodies as well as between the body and the world, with recourse to 
blends and contaminations which do not know interruptions between the 
human and the nonhuman: 
 
The grotesque body [...] is a body in the act of becoming. It is 
never finished, never completed; it is continually built, created, 
and builds and creates another body [...]. the grotesque ignores 
the impenetrable surface that closes and limits the body as a 
separate and completed phenomenon.  
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 The grotesque mode of representing the body and bodily life 
prevailed in art and creative forms of speech over thousands of 
years [...].  
 This boundless ocean of grotesque bodily imagery within 
time and space extends to all languages, all literatures, and the 
entire system of gesticulation; in the midst of it the bodily canon 
of art, belles lettres, and polite conversation of modern times is a 
tiny island. This limited canon never prevailed in antique 
literature. In the official literature of Eureopean peoples it has 
existed only for the last four hundred years  [...]. 
 The new bodily canon, in all its historic variations and 
different genres, presents an entirely finished, completed, 
strictly limited body, which is shown from the outside as 
something individual. (Bakhtin 1965, Eng. trans.: 317–320) 
 
Once official ideology functional to maintaining the established order and 
power of the dominant class is separated from unofficial ideology, the grotesque 
body is interdicted by official culture. The language of the grotesque body is rich 
in terms and expressions referring to body parts that most establish relations 
of interdependency and compromise with the world and the body of others. 
Such language can be traced among all peoples and all epochs. It always refers 
to a body that is not strictly delineated, stable, fulfilled in itself, but to a body 
connected to other bodies, in a relationship that is at least bicorporeal: 
 
The body of the new canon is merely one body; no signs of duality 
have been left. It is self-sufficient and speaks in its name alone. 
All that happens within it concerns it alone, that is, only the 
individual, closed sphere. Therefore, all the events taking place 
within it acquire one single meaning: death is only death, it never 
coincides with birth; old age is torn away from youth. (Ibid.: 321–
322) 
 
As Michel Foucault (1988) in particular has revealed (but let us also 
remember Ferruccio Rossi-Landi’s acute analyses as articulated in his books of 
the 1970s), division and separatism among the sciences are functional to the 
ideologico-social necessities of the “new cannon of the individualized body” 
(Bakhtin), which, in turn, is functional to the controlled insertion of bodies into 
the reproduction cycle of today’s production system.  
An ontological reformulation of bioethics in a global semiotic perspective 
that keeps account of today’s socio-economic context of global communication 
evidences two fundamental principles, what we may call exposition and 
dislocation. These principles allude to the human single individual as a living 
body interconnected with all other forms of life over the whole planet thanks to 
its condition of diachronic and synchronic intercorporeity. The human body is 
exposed with respect to techniques that encourage and favor subordination to 
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the knowledge-power of biopolitics (Foucault); and dislocated with respect to 
chronotopic coordinates, projects, structures and roles that are functional to 
reproduction of the same in the socio-economic system of global 
communication.   
 
12 For an open science of signs 
 
A global and detotalizing approach in semiotics demands availability in 
relation to the other, to an extreme degree, a disposition to respond, to listen to 
others in their otherness, a capacity for opening to the other, where such 
opening is not only measured in quantitative terms (the omnicomprehensive 
character of global semiotics), but also in qualitative terms. All semiotic 
interpretations by the student of signs, especially at a metasemiotic level, 
cannot ingore the dialogic relationship with the other. Dialogism is a 
fundamental condition for a semiotic approach in semiotics which, though 
oriented globally, privileges the tendency to open to the particular and the local 
rather than to englobe and enclose. Accordingly, we are describing an approach 
that privileges the tendency toward detotalization rather than totalization.  
As another great philosopher of our times, Emmanuel Levinas, has 
revealed, otherness obliges the totality to reorganize itself always anew in a 
process related to what he calls “infinity” (Levinas 1961). This concept can be 
related to the Peircean concept of “infinite semiosis”. This relation to infinity is 
far more than cognitive: beyond the established order, beyond the symbolic 
order, beyond our conventions and habits, it tells of a relationship of 
involvement and responsibility with the other. This relation to infinity is the 
relation with what is most refractory to the totality; consequently, it implies a 
relation to the otherness of others, to the otherness of the other person, not in 
the sense of another self like ourselves, another alter ego, an I belonging to the 
same community, but of an other in its extraneousness, strangeness, diversity, 
difference toward which we cannot be indifferent in spite of all the efforts and 
guarantees offered by the  logic of identity, by the identity of the I.  
Such considerations orient semiotics according to a plan that does not 
belong to any given  ideology. Out interest is in human signs and behavior as 
they ensues from awareness of the human being’s radical responsibility as a 
“semiotic animal” toward life. Properly understood, the “semiotic animal” is a 
responsible actor capable of signs of signs, of mediation, reflection, and 
awareness in relation to semiosis over the whole planet. In this sense global 
semiotics involves cognitive semiotics, but it is also open to a third dimension 
beyond the quantitative and the theoretical, that is to day, the ethical. Given its 
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focus on the ends and goals we strive to reach, for this particular dimension in 
sign studies we have proposed the term “semioethics” (Petrilli and Ponzio 
2003, 2005, 2010). 
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